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Abstract—Facial cosmetics have the ability to substantially
alter the facial appearance, which can negatively affect the
decisions of a face recognition. In addition, it was recently shown
that the application of makeup can be abused to launch so-called
makeup presentation attacks. In such attacks, the attacker might
apply heavy makeup in order to achieve the facial appearance
of a target subject for the purpose of impersonation.
In this work, we assess the vulnerability of a COTS face
recognition system to makeup presentation attacks employing
the publicly available Makeup Induced Face Spoofing (MIFS)
database. It is shown that makeup presentation attacks might
seriously impact the security of the face recognition system.
Further, we propose an attack detection scheme which distin-
guishes makeup presentation attacks from genuine authentication
attempts by analysing differences in deep face representations
obtained from potential makeup presentation attacks and cor-
responding target face images. The proposed detection system
employs a machine learning-based classifier, which is trained with
synthetically generated makeup presentation attacks utilizing
a generative adversarial network for facial makeup transfer
in conjunction with image warping. Experimental evaluations
conducted using the MIFS database reveal a detection equal error
rate of 0.7% for the task of separating genuine authentication
attempts from makeup presentation attacks.
Index Terms—Biometrics, face recognition, presentation attack
detection, makeup attack detection, deep face representation
I. INTRODUCTION
Presentation Attacks (PAs), a.k.a. spoofing attacks, represent
one of the most critical attack vectors against biometric recog-
nition systems [1]. This is particularly true for face recognition
where numerous Presentation Attack Instruments (PAIs) can
be employed by attackers, e.g. face printouts or masks [2], [3].
In the recent past, diverse countermeasures, i.e. Presentation
Attack Detection (PAD) methods, have been proposed for face
recognition systems to prevent said attacks. For surveys on this
topic the interested reader is referred to [2], [3]. Published
approaches can be categorised into software- and hardware-
based PAD schemes where the latter make use of additional
sensors, e.g. depth or NIR capture devices [3]. Even a PAI
with high attack potential (e.g. silicone masks) can be detected
reliably with a spectral signature analysis of the skin which
differentiates it from most artefacts [4].
Recently, Chen et al. [5] showed that makeup can also
be used to launch PAs. Makeup may substantially alter the
perceived facial texture and shape which can pose a challenge
to automated face recognition [6], [7]. When applied by
skilled users or professional makeup artists, makeup can be
(a) before (b) after (c) target
Fig. 1: Web-collected examples of face images of the makeup
artist Paolo Ballesteros (a) before and (b) after the application
of makeup with the intention of obtaining the facial appearance
of (c) target Hollywood stars.
abused with the aim of identity concealment or impersonation
[5]. In the latter case, makeup is applied in a way that the
face of an attacker looks similar to that of a target subject,
see figure 1. Different makeup artists have showcased the
possibility of transforming a face to that of a target subject
through the mere application of makeup. Such Makeup PAs
(M-PAs) pose a serious risk since these can not be prevented
by simply detecting makeup. More precisely, facial cosmetics
are socially acceptable in many parts of the world and cultural
communities. They have become a daily necessity for many
women to improve facial aesthetics in a simple and cost
efficient manner [6]. This is evidenced by the huge and steadily
growing market value of the facial cosmetics industry, e.g.
e77.6 billion in Europe in 2017 [8] and $63 billion in the
US in 2016 [9]. This means, the mere use of makeup must
not be interpreted as a PA. It is important to note that this
is not the case for other face PAIs species, which have been
considered so far in the scientific literature, e.g. face image
printouts or three-dimensional (silicone) masks. Makeup might
be used both in an innocent manner (bona fide subjects, who
are interacting with the capture device in the fashion intended
by the policy of the biometric system). However, it might as
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well be applied in a malicious manner (by subjects with the
intent to impersonate an enrolled target). This clearly makes
a reliable detection of M-PAs challenging. So far, only a few
research efforts have been devoted to the topic of M-PAD, e.g.
in the ODIN research program [10].
In this work, we use standardised ISO/IEC methodology
and metrics [11] to evaluate the vulnerability of a COTS face
recognition system against M-PAs. Further, an image pair-
based (i.e. differential) M-PAD system is introduced, which
takes as input a potential M-PA and a target reference image.
In this differential detection scenario, deep face representations
are estimated from both face images employing state-of-the-
art face recognition systems. Detection scores are obtained
from machine learning-based classifiers analyzing differences
in deep face representations. Said classifiers are trained with
a synthetic database of M-PAs (and bona fide authentication
attempts) which are generated using a Generative Adversarial
Network (GAN) for facial makeup transfer and image warping.
In experiments, the publicly available MIFS dataset1 is em-
ployed together with other publicly available face databases.
This paper is organised as follows: related works are dis-
cussed in section II. The proposed M-PAD system is described
in detail in section III. The experimental setup is summarised
in section IV and experimental results are presented in sec-
tion V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Makeup induces non-permanent alterations with the ability
to substantially alter the facial appearance. According to
Dantcheva et al. [6], makeup can be applied mainly in three
regions of the face, i.e. eyes, lips, and skin. Prominent exam-
ples of makeup alterations include altering of the perceived
contrast of the eyes, size of the mouth, as well as skin colour
[6], [7]. Further, the application of makeup can be categorised
w.r.t. intensity [6], namely as light makeup (makeup cannot
be easily perceived, since the applied colours correspond to
natural skin, lip, and eye colours) and heavy makeup (makeup
is clearly perceptible).
Dantcheva et al. [6] were the first to systematically investi-
gate the impact of facial makeup on face recognition systems.
Performance degradations were observed in the case where ei-
ther the reference or probe image had been altered by makeup.
Similar studies confirming these findings were conducted in
[12], [13]. Further, Ueda and Koyama [14] demonstrated that
the use of heavy makeup significantly decreases humans’
ability to recognise faces.
Towards achieving makeup-resilient face recognition, re-
searchers have introduced different face feature extraction and
comparison techniques. Several proposed approaches fused
information obtained from multiple types of features, e.g.
[15]–[17]. Additionally, different methods to detect makeup
have been proposed, e.g. [18]–[21]. Such makeup detection
schemes generally analyse facial colour, shape, and texture. In
particular, skin features such as colour and smoothness were
1Database available at http://www.antitza.com/makeup-datasets.html
effectively extracted by applying suitable texture descriptors,
e.g. LBP and HOG, together with machine learning-based clas-
sifiers. If the application of facial makeup has been detected
in a captured facial image, the face recognition system can
react accordingly, e.g. by applying the feature extraction with
different parameters [7].
(a) before (b) after (c) target
Fig. 2: Examples of cropped face images before and after the
application of makeup intended to obtain the facial appearance
of a target subject (images taken from the MIFS database).
Chen et al. [5] firstly investigated the potential of M-
PAs with the aim of impersonation. To this end, the authors
introduced the MIFS database, which was collected from
YouTube makeup video tutorials containing face images of
subjects before and after the application of makeup, as well
as target victims. Example images of this database are shown
in figure 2. Reported results suggested that different automated
face recognition systems are vulnerable to M-PAs while the
success chance of the attack is impacted by the appearance of
the attacker and the target subject. Similarly, Zhu et al. [22]
showed that the simulation of makeup in the digital domain
can be used to launch adversarial attacks. More recently,
Kotwal et al. [23] presented a deep learning-based M-PAD
system which was designed to detect M-PAs aimed at identity
concealment by emulating the effects of ageing. Interestingly,
this scheme was also reported to achieve competitive detection
performance on other databases in which makeup was applied
for the purpose of facial beautification. This might suggest that
the M-PAD system of [23] detects different kinds of makeup.
However, as mentioned before, the majority of subjects are not
expected to wear makeup with the aim of identity concealment
or impersonation but with the intent to beautify the overall
facial impression. In a preliminary study, Rathgeb et al. [24]
presented one of the first M-PAD systems in the scientific
literature with the aim of detecting impersonation M-PAs.
Focusing on general face PAD, numerous software-based
approaches have been presented in the last years [3]. A
comprehensive benchmark [25] which was conducted as part
of a face PAD competition revealed that only some of the
published approaches generalise against across PAIs and envi-
ronmental conditions. In contrast, hardware-based approaches
are expected to detect specific kinds of PAIs more reliably, but
obviously require additional sensors [2].
III. MAKEUP PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION
The following subsections describe the key components
of the proposed M-PAD system, see figure 3, including the
employed extraction of deep face representations and the
machine learning-based classification (section III-A) as well as
the generation of synthetic M-PA training data (section III-B).
Face pre-
processing
M-PA
(reject)
Bona fide
(accept)
Face pre-
processing
Deep face
representation
extraction
Deep face
representation
extraction
Feature
combination
reference image
probe image
(potential M-PA)
Machine
learning-based
decision
Fig. 3: Overview of the proposed M-PAD system.
A. Feature Extraction and Classification
Given a pair consisting of a trusted reference image and a
suspected probe image, faces are detected, normalised, and
deep face representations are extracted from both images
using a neural network of a state-of-the-art face recognition
algorithm (see section IV-A). Deep face recognition systems
leverage very large databases of face images to learn rich and
compact representations of faces. It is expected that alterations
induced by M-PAs will also be reflected in extracted deep
face representations, outputs of the neural network on the
lowest layer. Due to the high generalisation capabilities of
deep face recognition systems with respect to variations in
skin appearance, such changes might be more pronounced if
the application of makeup changes the perceived facial shape.
In principle, it would by possible to train a neural network
from scratch or to apply transfer learning and re-train a
pre-trained deep face recognition network to detect M-PAs.
However, the high complexity of the model, represented by
the large number of weights in the neural network, requires a
large amount of training data. Even if only the lower layers are
re-trained, the limited number of training images (and much
lower number of subjects) in used databases can easily result
in overfitting to the characteristics of the training set.
At classification, a pair of deep face representations ex-
tracted from a reference and probe face image are combined
by estimating their difference vector. Specifically, an element-
wise subtraction of feature vectors is performed. It is expected
that differences in certain elements of difference vectors
indicate M-PAs. In the training stage, difference vectors are
extracted and a Support Vector Machine (SVM) with a Ra-
dial Basis Function (RBF) kernel is trained to distinguish
bona fide authentication attempts and M-PAs. Alternatively,
a concatenation of deep face representations extracted from
reference and probe face images could be analysed. However,
resulting feature vectors would potentially exhibit a length
which prevent from an efficient classifier training.
It is important to note that compared to the proposed
differential M-PAD approach, a single image-based M-PAD
system is not expected to reliably detect M-PAs [24]. On
the contrary, a single image-based M-PAD system which only
analyses probe face images would most likely detect the mere
application of makeup which does not indicate M-PAs per se,
as explained in section II.
B. Training Data Generation
Due to the fact that there exists no publicly available face
database containing a sufficient amount of M-PAs to train
a M-PAD system, we automatically generate a database of
synthetic M-PAs. To this end, two face image transformations
are applied, see figure 4:
synthetic
M-PA
Image
warping
Facial makeup
transferprobe
target reference
Fig. 4: Processing steps of the generation of synthetic M-PAs.
1) Change of facial shape: the shape of a face can be
changed by heavily applying makeup, e.g. slimming of
contour and nose or enlargement of eyes, cf. figure 1.
To simulate said alterations with the aim of imperson-
ating a target subject image warping [26] is applied.
Specifically, facial landmarks of a target reference image
and the probe image are extracted. Subsequently, image
warping is applied to the probe face image w.r.t. the
landmarks detected in the target reference image. The
resulting probe face image will then exhibit the facial
shape of the target reference image. This transformation
is motivated by the fact that a skilled attacker, e.g.
makeup artist, would be able to change the appearance of
his own facial shape through the application of makeup.
2) Change of facial texture: the application of makeup can
substantially alter the perceived texture of a face. In
order to simulate textural changes induced by makeup
with the aim of impersonating a target subject a GAN-
based facial makeup transfer is employed (see sec-
tion IV-A). GANs have enabled an automated transfer
of full makeup styles, e.g. [27], [28]. Such transfer is
motivated by the demand of users attempting to copy
makeup styles of other individuals such as celebrities.
The aforementioned processing steps are applied to pairs of
randomly chosen target reference images containing makeup
and probe images of different subjects without makeup. For
both types of images frontal pose, relatively neutral facial
(a) before (b) after (c) target
Fig. 5: Examples of cropped face images before and after the
generation of synthetic M-PAs intended to obtain the facial
appearance of a target subject.
expression (e.g. closed mouth), and sample image quality are
automatically assured. Figure 5 depicts examples of resulting
transformed probe images which represent synthetic M-PAs.
Synthetic M-PAs are used in conjunction with unaltered pairs
of face images of the same subject which represent bona fide
authentication attempts.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The following subsections describe the software and
databases (section IV-A), as well as evaluation methodology
and metrics (section IV-B) used in the proposed M-PAD
system and in experimental evaluations.
A. Software and Databases
The dlib algorithm [29] is applied for face detection and
facial landmark extraction. The detected eye coordinates are
used for face alignment. Deep face representations are ex-
tracted using a re-implementation [30] of the well-known
FaceNet algorithm [31] and the open-source ArcFace system
[32]. For both feature extractors, the resulting feature vectors
consist of 512 floats. In addition, a COTS face recognition
system is used in the vulnerability analysis.
During the generation of synthetic M-PAs, image warping
is applied using OpenCV with dlib landmarks and a re-
implementation [33] of the BeautyGAN algorithm of Li et al.
[28] is used for facial makeup transfer. The scikit-learn library
[34] is used to train SVMs employing standard parameters.
Trained SVMs generate a normalised attack detection score in
the range [0, 1].
TABLE I: Overview of used databases.
Purpose Bona Fide M-PAs Impostor
Vulnerability Assessment MIFS, FRGCv2 MIFS FRGCv2
M-PAD Training FRGCv2 FRGCv2, CelebA –
M-PAD Testing MIFS, FERET MIFS –
Fig. 6: Example face images of the subset of the CelebA
database used for the training data generation for the proposed
M-PAD system.
Table I gives an overview of the used face image databases
and their purposes. The MIFS face database is used to conduct
the vulnerability assessment (see section V-A). This database
was introduced in [5], and consists of 642 images of 117
subjects. For each subject three categories of images are
available, i.e. original face images, M-PAs, and face images of
target subjects, see figure 2. The vulnerability assessment is
done by performing comparisons between M-PAs and target
images resulting in a total number of 428 M-PA attempts. It
is important to note that bona fide image pairs of the MIFS
face database exhibit almost no intra-class variation which
is unlikely in a real-world scenario. Therefore, additional
publicly available face image databases are used to obtain
further bona fide authentication attempts which have realistic
biometric variance, as it has also been done in [5]. For the
vulnerability analysis additional genuine score distributions are
obtained from a subset of the FRGCv2 face database [35].
Further, impostor score distributions are obtained from this
database which contains 2,710 images of 533 subjects resulting
in 3,298 genuine and 144,032 impostor comparisons.
In the training stage of the proposed M-PAD system, a
subset of the CelebA face database [36] is used as target
references. To obtain this subset, the CelebA face database has
been filtered to only contain face images with heavy use of
makeup, frontal pose, and closed mouth. Face sample quality
assurance has been conducted using the FaceQNet algorithm
[37] resulting in a total number of 641 face images of different
subjects. Example images of the resulting subset of the CelebA
face database are depicted in figure 6. Images of the CelebA
face database are randomly paired with face images of the
FRGCv2 database to generate 3,290 synthetic M-PAs which
are used together with the genuine authentication attempts of
the FRGCv2 database to train the proposed M-PAD scheme.
In order to evaluate the detection performance of the M-
PAD system, all M-PAs and bona fide comparisons of the
MIFS database are used. Note that bona fide comparisons of
the MIFS database include image pairs where makeup has
been applied to one or both faces. A subset of the FERET
face database [38] is additionally employed to obtain 529 bona
fide authentication attempts from different subjects. The use
of the FERET face database is motivated by the fact that the
FRGCv2 database has already been used in the training stage
of the M-PAD system.
B. Evaluation Metrics
Biometric performance is evaluated in terms of False Non-
Match Rate (FNMR) and False Match Rate (FMR) [39].
The performance of the M-PAD system is reported according
to metrics defined in ISO/IEC 30107-3:2017 [11] and its
current revision. For the vulnerability assessment, the Impos-
tor Attack Presentation Match Rate (IAPMR) [11] defines
the proportion of attack presentations using the same PAI
species in which the target reference is matched. The Rel-
ative Impostor Attack Presentation Accept Rate (RIAPAR)
establishes a relationship between IAPMR and 1−FNMR, i.e.
the biometric recognition performance of the attacked system,
RIAPAR=1+(IAPMR−(1−FNMR)), as originally proposed
by Scherhag et al. [40]. The Attack Presentation Classification
Error Rate (APCER) is defined as the proportion of attack
presentations using the same PAI species incorrectly classified
as bona fide presentations in a specific scenario. The Bona Fide
Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER) is defined as
the proportion of bona fide presentations incorrectly classified
as PAs in a specific scenario. Further, as suggested in [11]
the BPCER10 and BPCER20 represent the operation points
ensuring a security level of the system at an APCER of 10%
and 5%, respectively. Additionally, the Detection Equal-Error
Rate (D-EER) is reported.
V. EXPERIMENTS
The following subsections summarise the conducted vulner-
ability assessment (section V-A) and the obtained detection
results of the M-PAD method (section V-B).
A. Vulnerability Analysis
Table II and table III list statistics of score distributions and
the vulnerability assessment, respectively. It can be observed
that the IAPMRs and RIAPARs, i.e. success chances, obtained
by the original M-PAs are moderately high for practically
relevant FMRs, i.e. up to 17% for a FMR of 1%. This
underlines the vulnerability of the face recognition system
towards high quality M-PAs.
TABLE II: Descriptive statistics of score distributions.
Distribution Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Genuine 0.945 0.033 0.021 0.996
Impostor 0.057 0.064 0.000 0.905
Attack 0.168 0.164 0.000 0.837
B. Detection Performance
Obtained detection accuracies of the M-PAD system for em-
ploying the different deep face representations are summarised
in table IV. Corresponding M-PAD score distributions are
plotted in figure 7. Corresponding DET curves are depicted
TABLE III: Vulnerability in relation to biometric performance
(in %).
FMR FNMR IAPMR RIAPAR
0.001 6.274 0.000 6.274
0.010 0.083 2.103 2.186
0.100 0.028 6.308 6.336
1.000 0.028 17.056 17.084
in figure 8. While the use of the FaceNet algorithm for the
purpose of deep face representation extraction results in a D-
EER of 3.271%, the use of ArcFace achieves a D-EER of
0.701% for the task of distinguishing bona fide authentication
attempts from M-PAs.
TABLE IV: Error rates of the M-PAD system (in %).
Deep Face Representation D-EER BPCER10 BPCER20
FaceNet 3.271 0.904 2.169
ArcFace 0.701 0.361 0.361
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Fig. 7: M-PAD score distributions for the M-PAD system.
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Fig. 8: DET curves of the M-PAD system.
VI. CONCLUSION
We assessed the vulnerability of a COTS face recognition
system against M-PAs. It was found that M-PAs of good
quality, i.e. ones which mimic the facial texture as well as the
shape of an impersonated target subject, can pose a serious
risk to the security of face recognition systems. In contrast,
M-PAs based on a simple makeup style transfers have a rather
low success rate.
In addition, we proposed a differential M-PAD system
which analyses differences in deep face representations ex-
tracted from a pair of reference and probe face images.
Detection scores were obtained from SVM-based classifiers
which have been trained to distinguish difference vectors
from a training set of bona fide authentication attempts and
synthetically generated M-PAs. In performance tests using the
MIFS face database, the proposed M-PAD system was shown
to achieve encouraging D-EERs of approximately 3.3% and
0.7% applying the FaceNet and ArcFace algorithm for the ex-
traction of deep face representations, respectively. That is, the
presented M-PAD scheme can be used to effectively prevent
M-PAs and hence improve the security of face recognition
systems.
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